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Abstract: We offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close
relative of the nucleolus and the kernel. We look for a set of weights that preserves
winning coalitions that has the property of minimizing the difference between the
weight of the smallest and the weight of the largest Minimum Winning Coalition.
We claim that such a set of weights provides an a priori measure of a weighted
voter’s bribeworthiness or market value. After introducing our model, we provide a
characterization result and show its links to other bargaining model approaches in
the literature. Then we offer some limit results showing that, with certain reasonable
conditions on the distributions of weights, as the size of the voting body increases,
the values of bribeworthiness we calculate will approach both the weights themselves
and the Banzhaf scores for the weighted voting game. We also show that, even for
relatively small groups using weighted voting, such as the membership of the Euro-
pean Council of Ministers (and its precedessors) 1958–2003, similarities among the
usual a priori power scores, bribeworthiness/market value, and the weights them-
selves, will be quite strong.
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1. Introduction
The approach we offer is very similar in spirit to work from the game theoretic
literature on bargaining games such as the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set, and to
closely related work on ”near-core” solutions such as the nucleolus and the kernel
(Aumann and Maschler, 1964; Maschler, Peleg and Shapley, 1979; Schmeidler, 1969;
see also McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer, 1978; Sudho¨lter, 2001).1 But it is even
more similar to the work of Young (1978) and that of Taylor and Zwicker (1997;
see also Taylor and Zwicker, 1993) and other work on bribery models (e.g., Snyder,
1991), as well as to work on power rankings based on membership in minimal winning
coalitions (e.g.; Morriss, 2002).2
Specifically, we suggest that the set of values that minimizes the range of values
(i.e. highest minus lowest) of the size of the minimum winning coalitions in a game
will determine what we might call the approximate fungible power scores, or approx-
imate market values. In contrast, the nucleolus can be thought of as minimizing the
maximum complaints made by coalitions, while the kernel seeks to balance claims
by individuals.
Maschler (1992) points out that the Aumann-Maschler bargaining model and re-
lated approaches (the kernel and the nucleolus) assume that a given coalition has
been formed, and then ask how the members of that coalition will bargain over the
spoils that coalition can gain.3 Here, however, rather than assuming bargaining
among the members of an already formed coalition, we posit an external entre-
preneur making bids to individuals with the aim of assembling a winning
coalition, and seeking to minimize the total amount of bribes s/he pays out by
paying potential members of some winning coalition no more than s/he is ”worth”
– in a setting where the structure of the weighted game is such that one can usually
1Our conceptual approach is rooted in the presentation of Feld and Grofman, 2002.
2For example, Morriss (2002:167-68), following Goldman (1974) proposes a rank-ordered idea of
power by ranking players by the number of minimal winning coalitions of which they are a part
(breaking ties by looking at membership in coalitions of the next smallest size).
3See also Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979).
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replace that member with some one or more others to achieve a different coalition
that will also have a majority sufficient for winning.4
The chief attractions of the bargaining model variant we offer are three-fold. First,
while it is a kissing cousin to other better known methods, it can be described and
explained quite simply. Second, its roots are relatively intuitive. Third, and perhaps
most importantly for present purposes, we provide a numerical method that allows
us to calculate its values.
2. Market Values in Homogeneous Majority Voting Games
To motivate our bargaining model variant, we begin with what are called homoge-
neous weights, i.e., a weighted voting game in which all minimal winning coalitions
(henceforth abbreviated MWCs) have equal total weights (Zwicker and Taylor, 1997:
51). We call a game homogeneous if it has a weighted representation with homoge-
neous weights. Note that this definition also applies to voting games that are not
weighted in the first place.5 Consider a five-voter example, where A is given a weight
of 3, and the other four actors a weight of 1, with a quota of four. The MWCs are
A, together with any one of B,C,D and E; or the set {B,C,D,E}. Note that all
these MWCs have exactly 4 votes. Of course there are an infinite number of possible
weights (plus quotas) which give rise to the same MWCs.6 Nonetheless, if we are
given a game which gives rise to some set of minimal winning coalitions, it seems
reasonable to represent that game in the most parsimonious way possible, and if
we can find homogeneous weights to represent a game it seems reasonable to do
4Our approach is thus analogous to identifying a market clearing price structure.
5See Freixas and Zwicker (2003) for a combinatorial characterization for voting games that have
weighted representations.
6For example, if we assigned weights of one 9 and four 4s, or weights of one 15 and four 4s, we get
the same MWCs as previously. These weighted voting games all allow the ”big guy” and one ”little
guy: or all four little guys to make a decision. Yet, these relative weights are very different from one
and different from our original representation. But more importantly for present purposes, these
two later representations do not have the property that all minimal winning coalitions have the
same total value. With one 9 and four 4s, the mixed coalition adds up to 13, while the little guy
coalition adds to 16. With one 15 and four 4s, the mixed coalition adds to 19, and the little guy
coalition adds to 16. So, these weights do not meet our condition.
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so.7 For games with homogeneous weights, weights can be regarded as measures of
each actor’s market value/bribeworthines. Moreover, even for such seemingly easy
to model games, the market values so determined can be quite far from the values
determined by indices such as those of Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik.
We begin with an analysis of simple majority games. In such games, neglecting
ties, winning coalitions and coalitions with power to block winning outcomes are
one and the same. Our model assumes that the primary value of votes is their
value in exchange. The question we examine is how much each voter’s share of
weights is worth to an outsider who would purchase a collective decision. For a
majority rule game, purchasing a collective decision requires purchasing a majority
vote. Since it is reasonable to assume that the purchaser will not pay any more than
necessary, it seems reasonable that he will purchase no more than a minimal winning
coalition. Furthermore, since purchasers are willing to pay the same amount for any
minimal coalition, if actors are otherwise indifferent among alternatives, the value of
all minimal winning coalitions should converge towards having the same total price.
For any weighted majority rule voting game, if we could set up a series of linear
equations in which the sum of the values of the actors in each minimal winning
coalition is equal to the sum of the values in every other minimal winning coalition,
and we normalize those values to sum to one, and that set of simultaneous equations
has a unique solution, then the values so arrived at would give us a natural way to
establish the relative market values (bribeworthiness) of each actor. For homogenous
games, we have a nice result.
Proposition 1. If a weighted majority rule voting game is homogeneous and
decisive8, then this set of linear equations involving minimal winning coalitions9 has
7Moreover, for a game with homogeneous weights, if we either assume no dummies or that all
dummies have a weight of zero, then a game with weights that are exact multiples of those weights
also gives rise to the same set of MWCs, i.e., the weighted voting game with A given a weight of 3k
and with four actors with weights of 1k, with a quota of 4k, will generate the same set of MWCs
as the homogeneous game with weights of (3, 1, 1, 1, 1) with a quota of 4.
8A game is decisive if the complement of any losing coalition is winning.
9If we focus on minimal winning coalitions we are implicitly excluding dummies, who would be
assigned a value of zero.
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a unique normalized solution. In this situation, the market value (bribeworthiness)
of any non-dummy actor is proportional to that actor’s weight.10
For a proof see Theorem 3.7 in Gurk and Isbell (1959), p. 262.
For games with homogeneous weights we can thus arrive at a notion of what we
shall call fungible power, i.e., a situation in which weight and power are the same.
We will illustrate this proposition with the previous example, where A has three
votes and each of the other four voters has a single vote, and thus each minimal
coalition has exactly four votes. Our approach focuses attention on the fact that
the three votes of actor A are directly substitutable for the votes of any three other
actors, and that should be reflected in their power scores – at least if we neglect
transaction costs. But, then, by symmetry, the actor whose share is three votes
should have market power equal to the total of any other three voters. If values are
normalized, then the market value scores are (.430, .143, .143, .143, .143).
Note that these weights are substantially different from what we got from the
two standard power scores: the Banzhaf values of (.636, .091, .091, .091, .091), and
the Shapley-Shubik power scores of (.60, .10, .10, .10, .10). Unlike the usual power
score approach we do not assume that an actor who is pivotal in many coalitions
will be more heavily bribed. Rather, since only one coalition will actually form, we
ask what, in that coalition, is a reasonable ”bribe” for that actor, given that all
actors in the winning coalition will have to be paid ”what they are worth”. Note
also that the method we have initially used to assessing market value makes no
assumptions whatsoever about the likelihoods of particular coalitions, or about the
extent of common interests among actors. Indeed, in the calculations we gave, it
turns out not to matter howmany different coalitions an actor is decisive or pivotal
10Even if we have homogeneous weights, this does not guarantee that the solution to the relevant
system of equations will be unique when the game is not decisive. Consider the homogeneous four
voter game with weights 1, 2, 2 and 3 and a quota of 5 votes. To assign consistent weights so that
each minimum winning coalition gets the same payoff we must have B = C and D = A+ B. One
possibility is (1/8, 1/4, 1/4, 3/8), but another is (0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3). And, there are an infinite number
of other feasible weight assignments. In this example, the second solution given is the nucleolus
(see Maschler, 1992).
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in. Rather, what matters is her imputed market power relative to set of coalitions
in which s/he might find herself.
Unfortunately, there are sets of weights for which there is no functionally equiva-
lent homogeneous set of weights.11 For example, consider a weighted voting game in
which A,B,C,D,E, F have, respectively, weights 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, totaling 21, with a
vote quota of 11 votes. It can be readily determined that these weights are not ho-
mogeneous. ACD is a minimal winning coalition with 13 votes, and AB is another
MWC, but it has 11 votes. Since all MWCs do not have the same total votes, the
set of weights is not homogeneous. With further analysis, it is also apparent that
there does not exist any homogeneous set of weights that is functionally equivalent
to these weights in terms of giving rise to the same set of minimal winning coalitions.
To see this, we simply observe that if all minimal winning coalitions in the game
above would have the same totals, then, i. a., the weight of ACE would have to
equal that of ADE, and therefore the weight of C would have to equal that of D.
On the other hand, BCE is a minimal winning coalition, but BDE is not – so C
and D can never have the same weights under this decision rule. This is sufficient to
show that there can be no homogeneous set of weights for this game. We conclude
Remark 2.1. Market values are uniquely defined only for games that can be rep-
resented with homogeneous weights.
We can further illustrate this remark using the weighted majority rule voting game
example discussed immediately above. The minimum winning coalitions are
{A,B}, {A,C,D}, {A,C,E}, {A,C, F}, {B,C,D}, (A,D,E}, {B,D,E, F}.
If we equate the values of the members of each of these minimal winning coalitions
to one another, we get the set of equations below: A+B = A+C+D = A+C+E =
A+C+F = B+C+D = A+D+E = B+D+E+F . Normalizing, we also require:
A + B + C + D + E = 1. However, it is easy to see that there is no consistent
solution to this set of equations.
11Elsewhere we have generated some theorems about conditions sufficient to guarantee the existence
of a set of homogeneous weights . These results are available upon request from the authors.
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The fact that most voting games cannot be represented with homogeneous weights
might seem to be a major limitation of our approach. But we will show how we can
extend our notion of fungible power scores beyond the case of games with homoge-
neous weights for the case of games where a set of constraining equations does not
have a solution, by considering the best approximation to homogeneous weights.
3. Conceptualizing Bribeworthiness for Weighted Majority Rule
Voting Games without Homogeneous Weights by Calculating
Approximate Market Values
We previously suggested that all minimal winning coalitions should have the same
total value, because an outsider would not pay more for any one minimal winning
coalition than for any other. But we would argue that, even if there is no way
to make the values exactly equal, there will still be a tendency towards making
the values of the minimal winning coalitions as similar as possible. Specifically, we
suggest that the set of values that minimizes the range of values (i.e. highest minus
lowest) will determine what we might call the approximate fungible power scores,
or approximate market values. We have been able to estimate these power scores
by reducing the problem to solving a standard optimization problem with quadratic
objective function and linear side constraints.12 For details see section B in the
appendix.
Let us again consider the system of equations above, for a game with weights of
6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively, with a majority quota of 11, now with the aim of
generating a ”plausible” set of weights as illustrated in Table 1. While both our
approximate market values and the Banzhaf scores recognize the equivalence of the
actors initially given weights of 2 and 3, there are big differences in the estimated
market values of some of the other actors. Specifically, our value for the actor
with smallest weights is more than twice her Banzhaf score, and our value for the
actor with the third-highest weighting is much less than her Banzhaf score. As a
12The computer program we use to calculate optimal weights automatically excludes dummies.
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Table 1. Normalized Weights, Estimated Market Values, and
Banzhaf Scores for an Illustrative Six Voter Majority Rule Weighted
Voting Game
Weights 1 2 3 4 5 6 Size rangeof MWCs
Normalized
weights .048 .095 .0143 .190 .238 .286 .095
Estimated
market
shares
.074 .111 .111 .148 .259 .296 .037
Banzhaf
scores .036 .107 .107 .179 .250 .321
Quota: 11 = 52.38% of 21.
consequence, the ratio between the fourth actor and the first is 2:1 for our approach,
compared with 5:1 for the Banzhaf scores.13
4. Plausible Mechanisms for Bribery
We can imagine a number of different mechanisms by which bribery of the sort
contemplated in this paper might be implemented, but two stand out for their
intuitive plausibility. In each, the potential briber has in mind how much a favorable
outcome is worth to him/her.
13If the Banzhaf scores shown in Table 1 were themselves to used as weights, they would describe
a slightly different game from the original game; i.e. they do not yield the same set of MWCs. In
the original game, {5, 3, 2, 1} is a MWC, but the Banzhaf scores for these actors add to exactly .50,
not enough for the quota. A slight modification of these scores (increasing the value for the 1 and
decreasing it for the 4) reproduces the original game. When that modification is made, the range
in values of the MWCs is more than .10 for these values, which is greater than for the original
normalized weights.
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In one, the briber offers a total bribe to some particular minimal winning coalition,
and expects the members of this coalition to bargain among themselves about how
to share this bribe among themselves. In such a situation, actors might assess their
marginal value to coalitions in terms of the likelihood that if a given coalition fails
to form because they, a pivotal member of that coalition refuse to join it, they could
still expect to be a member of some other winning coalition in which they would
be pivotal. While this probability can be defined in urn model terms, even in this
case, we might think that actors would consider not their probability of being in
a coalition in which they are decisive (or pivotal) but rather their value to the
coalitions in which they are, with equivalent (sets of) actors being paid the same
bribe. This latter type of collective bargaining agreement story offers one type of
rationale that has been offered for the nucleolus and related concepts (Maschler,
1992: 611).14
A second way to think of the coalition formation process makes use of ideas from
the literature on sequential coalition formation. (See e.g., Brams, 1972, Brams and
Garrigo-Pico, 1975; Brams and Riker, 1972; Grofman, 1982; Straffin and Grofman,
1984; Grofman, 1996; Grofman, Straffin and Noviello, 1996.) Here the bribe offerer
can be thought of as fishing for bribe-takers, one or more at a time, and throwing
them back in if they demand too large a bribe. This ”fishing” continues until a
winning coalition is reached.15
While both these mechanisms posit only a single briber, we believe the idea of
market value can be extended to the two competing bribers case along the lines
discussed in Owen (1992).16
14If bribery is to be of a given coalition, we might think of this as analogous to purchasing an
entire meal from a prix fixe menu with an already specified set of items that can be purchased as
a package, and with some items found in more than one package.
15We may think of this piscatorial perspective as treating bribery more like choice from an a la
carte menu than from a pre-specified package of entries.
16There one bidder (the incumbent) chooses an imputation x, while another (the challenger) chooses
a second imputation y which presumably dominates x. Now the incumbent looks for a z as close
as possible to x that would dominate y. The problem (for the incumbent) then was to choose the
original x so as to minimize the eventual distance from x to z; for the challenger, it was to choose y
so as to maximize this distance. For simple games of the sort considered here, this calculation was
not that difficult, but for more general games it was incredibly difficult.
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5. Robustness of Minimal Winning Coalitions
Because our modeling approach is based on the idea of those with a stake in the
outcome ”bribing” voters to either achieve a particular outcome or to block change
from the status quo, there might appear to be no reason for a briber to purchase
more than a minimal winning coalition. Nonetheless, for two reasons, we might
anticipate that observed voting coalitions would be larger than minimal winning.
First, some unbribed voters might vote for the winning outcome even if they get no
bribe. Consequently, even though actors are only willing to pay for minimal winning
coalitions, the ”free” votes might make the actual winning coalitions considerably
larger than minimal. Of course, if there are voters who can be counted on to vote
as the briber wants without being bribed, and if the briber knows who they are,
then the size of the coalition which must be bribed in order to assembly a minimal
winning coalition is reduced, and we can simply do the market value calculations
for the set of remaining voters.17
Second, however, some processes for forming minimal winning coalitions can ac-
tually result in larger than minimal outcomes. Consider, for example, what happens
if we apply the sequential ”fishing for minimal winning coalitions” process to the
game with four voters, A,B,C and D, with weights 1, 2, 3 and 4 , respectively and
a quota of 6. If the briber’s sequence of contacts is first A, then C, than D, and
each accepts the bribes offered them, and no reneging on the part of either briber or
bribee is possible, then the winning coalition formed will be of weight 8, and will be
non- minimal-winning, since member A can be deleted without affecting the winning
status of the coalition.18
17We can thus neglect ”fixed votes” since they do not affect the fundamental structure of our results.
18We might think, though, that, for purposes of reducing transaction costs, if no other, the potential
bribers would begin by trying to bribe the more highly weighted actors.
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6. Approximately Fungible Power in Qualified Majority Rule
Non-Homogeneous Weighted Voting Games
Note that our discussion above applies to majority rule, i.e., where either a coali-
tion is winning or its complement is winning. These ideas can readily be extended to
qualified majority rule (i.e. involving higher than majority quotas). A qualified
majority rule is homogeneous when all minimal winning coalitions have the same
values as one another and all minimal blocking coalitions have the same value as
one another. Such sets of weights, if they exist, are unique up to a scalar multiplier,
just as for majority rule. For homogeneous qualified majority rule weighted voting
games it seems straightforward to use the weights as market values.
When a qualified majority rule game does not possess a representation in terms of
homogeneous weights then, just as with majority rule games, there is a discrepancy
between the largest and smallest MWC, but there is also a discrepancy between
the smallest and largest minimum blocking coalition (MBC). We would now suggest
that, for qualified majority rule games, approximately fungible power or approximate
market share values be defined as the weights that minimize the larger of these two
discrepancies.
7. Applications to the European Union
We show in Table 2-6 in Appendix A, for the period 1958-2003, the actual EU
weights, the Banzhaf scores, and our computer algorithm-based estimates of the
best-fitting market values, i.e., the weight assignments that bring the game closest
to homogeneity.
Note that, as we eyeball the data, the estimated market share weights and the
actual weights are close, and appear to be getting closer as the number of members
of the Council of Ministers increases over the five weight assignments we are looking
at. But of course, we must be careful in interpreting this finding since there are
many different ”actual” weights that could have been used to represent the same set
of minimal winning coalitions. Indeed, in 1981 the resemblance between the actual
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weights and our estimated weights in Table 2 underestimates the degree of fit of the
market value model, since that game is actually homogeneous – a fact that we do
not see from the actual weights, but can only discover when we look for weights that
will bring us closer to homogeneity.
8. Propositions about Convergence Among Alternative Approaches
to Power
8.1. Market-Based Power and Weights in the Limit. Although we can readily
find hypothetical (or even actual) examples in which the best estimates of market
share values give us minimal winning coalitions of substantially unequal weight, in
practice, often the ”optimal” weights/approximate market share values generated
by our computer program will produce small differences between the weight share
of the largest and the smallest MWC, even when the size of the weighted voting
body is relatively small. In the previous section of the paper we presented empirical
results for the EU Council of Ministers about the discrepancies between the largest
and smallest MWCs (and MBCs) to provide unequivocal evidence that problems
caused for our approximation approach to market values by the existence of non-
homogeneous MWCs may not be that serious in at least some real world settings.
We also suggested that the similarities tended to increase with an increase in the
size of the Council of Ministers.
We can generalize that insight. For very large voting bodies, under plausible
conditions, we might expect the differences between the weight share of the largest
and the smallest MWC to be very small, indeed. Now we turn to results about
limiting theorems. We will consider larger and larger sets of voters, with certain
assumptions.
Suppose that the relative quota, q, is given, not as a fixed number of votes, but
rather as some fraction (say .5 or .667) of the total number of votes. This q is kept
fixed. We then define an increasing chain, as a sequence of sets, A1 ⊂ A2 ⊂ ...Ak ⊂
Ak+1 ⊂ ... of players. The total number of players grows without bound. Each of
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the players, i, is assigned a weight, wi, a positive integer, which is the number of
votes he has. (We disregard the existence of dummies.) Let ak be the total number
of votes in Ak. Then, for a given Ak, a winning coalition will be any coalition that
has at least qak (or, in some cases, more than qak) votes. We then let hk be the
smallest integer that has this property. Thus, the game in Ak is simply a voting
game in which any coalition with at least hk votes wins.
Now, in any minimal winning coalition S, the total number of votes is at most
hk + wm − 1, where wm is the weight of the weakest player in S. In turn, this
wm ≤ wM,k, where wM,k is the weight of the strongest player in Ak. Note that
equality might actually hold here. For example, in a game with a total of 73 votes,
suppose q = 0.5. Then any coalition with at least 37 votes will win. Suppose that,
among the 73 votes, total, there are 10 players with 4 votes each (and none with
more than 4). Then these 10 players form a minimal winning coalition, with a total
of 40 votes. Thus the excess here is 3 votes, i.e., exactly wM,k − 1. We now put a
condition on the weights of the several players:
Assumption 8.1. There is a maximal value, α, such that no player in the chain
has more than α votes.
With this condition, we see that the discrepancy can never be more than α − 1.
In fact, any minimal winning coalition has at least hk, and at most hk+α−1 votes.
Similarly, any minimal blocking coalition will have at least bk = ak − hk + 1 votes,
and (by an argument similar to the one above) at most bk + α− 1 votes. Moreover,
note that this upper bound can only be attained if there are sufficiently many voters
with this maximal weight - enough to form a winning coalition all by themselves.
An easy corollary of this is that the relative discrepancy (i.e., the discrepancy as
a fraction of total votes) will be bounded by (α − 1)/ak. Thus, in the limit, the
relative discrepancy goes to zero.
The next question is whether the weights can be changed in some way to decrease
the absolute discrepancy. This can always be done by dividing all weights by the
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same constant, so we will assume that all weights are integers, and that the greatest
common divisor of these weights is 1.
It is clear that, in many cases, the discrepancy can be decreased. For example,
suppose that, in some Ak, there are 50 voters with weight 2, and one (call him j)
with weight 3. This means ak = 103, so that, with q = 0.5, the winning coalitions
are those with at least 52 votes. However, there are minimal winning coalitions
consisting of voter j, along with 25 of the remaining voters. These have 53 votes, and
thus there is a discrepancy of 1 unit. It is then possible to decrease the discrepancy
by decreasing j’s weight to 2. Then all minimal winning coalitions have a total of
52 votes, and there is 0 discrepancy. The point is that player j’s extra vote does
him no good in this situation, and he is no more bribe-worthy than any of the other
players.
In general, we can conceive of a situation in which some minimal winning coalitions
have exactly h votes, while one minimal winning coalition, S, has h+d votes, where
d > 0. Thus there is a discrepancy of d votes. Let j ∈ S, and suppose j has wj
votes, where wj = 2. In that case, by decreasing wj to w′j = wj−1, the total number
of votes in S decreases to h + d − 1. This would decrease the discrepancy – unless
j belongs to some other winning coalition, T , with exactly h votes. Then the total
number of votes in T would also decrease by 1 unit, so the discrepancy would still
be equal to d. Therefore, we would like the following to happen: that every player
belong to some winning coalition with exactly hk votes.
This same condition is important from another point of view. In fact, we would
like wj to represent the bribeworthiness of player j. The briber wishes to ”buy” a
winning coalition as cheaply as possible. Thus we can expect that he will bribe, not
merely a minimal winning coalition, but one for which the sum of the bribes is a
minimum. Assume next that the players’ demands are proportional to their weights.
Now, if player j does not belong to such a minimum-cost winning coalition, then
she will never be bribed, i.e., the demand wj will have priced her out of the market.
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Once again, therefore, stability of the situation requires that each player belong to
such a minimum-cost coalition. To be sure of this, we make another assumption:
Assumption 8.2. Among the weights, there is some subset W = {w1, w2, ..., wr},
with greatest common divisor equal to 1. Moreover, for each l, 1 ≤ l ≤ r, the number
of players (in set Ak) with weight wl grows without bound as k →∞.
With this assumption, we have the following:
Proposition 2. Under assumptions 8.1 and 8.2, then for sufficiently large k,
each player i ∈ Ak belongs to at least one coalition T ⊂ Ak with exactly hk votes.
Thus the discrepancy cannot be decreased by the simple expediency of decreasing
j’s weight.
The proof of this statement is given in the Appendix (see Lemma C.2).
Of course, such a result holds also for blocking coalitions:
Corollary 8.1. Under assumptions 8.1 and 8.2, then for sufficiently large k,
each player i ∈ Ak belongs to at least one coalition T ⊂ Ak with exactly bk votes,
where bk = ak − hk + 1.
8.2. Market-Based Power and Banzhaf (or Shapley-Shubik) Values in the
Limit. The central claimed justification for making use of power scores is that the
weights themselves are not good indicators of a voter’s bargaining power. Yet, when
we define voter bargaining power in ”bribeworthiness” terms, the arguments above
suggest that, for homogeneous games, power will actually be directly proportional
to voter weight, and even for small non-homogeneous games, power will often be
approximately proportional to weight. Now we wish to show that, for large non-
homogeneous games with many players, if the weight distribution satisfies certain
assumptions, power will converge to be proportional to the voter weight.
Proposition 3. Under the same assumptions as in Proposition 2, and assuming
that q = 0.5, the Banzhaf-Coleman index will, in the limit as k →∞, be proportional
to the number of votes.
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For a proof see Theorem 3.6 in Lindner and Machover (2003, p. 47).
Note: Interestingly enough, Proposition 3 does not generalize to the case where
q 6= 0.5. See Chang, Chua and Machover (2005) who use simulation to test these
results.
For the Shapley value, we will use one further definition. Given the chain A1 ⊂
A2 ⊂ ...Ak ⊂ Ak+1 ⊂ ..., we will say a weight w is frequent if there exists β > 0
such that, for all sufficiently large k, the number of voters with weight w in set Ak
is at least βak.
Proposition 4. Given the chain A1 ⊂ A2 ⊂ ...Ak ⊂ Ak+1 ⊂ ..., suppose the
weight wi is a frequent weight. Let ϕi be the Shapley value of a player with weight
wi. Then in the limit as k →∞, the product akϕi → wi.
For a proof see Theorem 2.3 in Lindner and Machover (2003, p. 44).
9. Discussion
While Propositions 2-4 hold only in the limit, the empirical results we gave in the
previous section for the European Council of Ministers suggest, that even for the
relatively limited number of actors in the various historical Common Market and
EU weighted voting games, there is considerable concordance of actual weights and
power scores - at least once we specify the appropriate equivalent set of weights
in each case that minimizes the discrepancy between largest and smallest minimum
winning coalition. In this context we would also note that recent work of Gelman,
Katz and Bafumi (2004: 662) finds that weights in the U.S. Electoral College major-
ity rule weighted voting game in 2004 are very close to the a priori Shapley-Shubik
values for that game, while Owen (1975) found a similar result for the 1970 Electoral
College.
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Appendix A. Values of (Normalized) EU Weights, Estimated
Market-Values, and Banzhaf Scores: 1958–1995
Table 2. 1958
1958 wts normalizedwts
normalized
wts*
market value
wts2*
Banzhaf
scores
1 .059 0 0 0
2 .118 .125 .125 .143
2 .118 .125 .125 .143
4 .235 .250 .250 .238
4 .235 .250 .250 .238
4 .235 .250 .250 .238
∗: dummy omitted
Quota: 12 = 70.59% of 17.
Table 3. 1973
1973 wts normalizedwts
market value
wts
Banzhaf
scores
2 .035 .018 .016
3 .052 .053 .066
3 .052 .053 .066
5 .086 .088 .092
5 .086 .088 .092
10 .172 .175 .167
10 .172 .175 .167
10 .172 .175 .167
10 .172 .175 .167
Quota: 41 = 70.69% of 58.
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Table 4. 1981
1981 wts normalizedwts
market value
wts
Banzhaf
scores
2 .032 .032 .016
3 .048 .048 .067
3 .048 .048 .067
5 .079 .079 .092
5 .079 .079 .092
5 .079 .079 .092
10 .159 .159 .167
10 .159 .159 .167
10 .159 .159 .167
10 .159 .159 .167
Quota: 45 = 71.43% of 63.
Table 5. 1986
1986 wts normalizedwts
market value
wts
Banzhaf
scores
2 .027 .013 .018
3 .040 .040 .046
3 .040 .040 .046
5 .066 .067 .067
5 .066 .067 .067
5 .066 .067 .067
5 .066 .067 .067
8 .105 .107 .109
10 .132 .133 .129
10 .132 .133 .129
10 .132 .133 .129
10 .132 .133 .129
Quota: 54 = 71.05% of 76.
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Table 6. 1995
1986 wts normalizedwts
market value
wts
Banzhaf
scores
2 .023 .025 .023
3 .035 .036 .036
3 .035 .036 .036
3 .035 .036 .036
4 .046 .046 .048
4 .046 .046 .048
5 .058 .057 .059
5 .058 .057 .059
5 .058 .057 .059
5 .058 .057 .059
8 .092 .093 .093
10 .115 .114 .112
10 .115 .114 .112
10 .115 .114 .112
10 .115 .114 .112
Quota: 62 = 71.26% of 87.
Appendix B. Numerical Method for Computing Market Values
An algorithm for our purposes has two main duties: (a) to determine the MWCs
and (b) determine weights with minimal variation of the MWCs’ weight sum.
(a) Here, we follow the definition of a MWC directly. This suggests an algorithm
which generates the set of all possible coalitions and identifies the minimal winning
ones. Note that this method is not without limitation due to exponential complexity
of the order 2n, where n is the number of players. In literature, a standard approach
to evaluate weighted voting games with respect to various (power) measures is the
method of generating functions19. This routine counts the number of winning coali-
tions for all possible weight sums by means of the coefficients of specific polynomials.
19The key computational idea goes back to David G. Cantor who suggested it to Irwin Mann and
Lloyd S. Shapley following a lecture in Princeton University, October 1960. For further details see
Mann and Shapley 1960.
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The problem reduces then to carrying out iterations whose computational effort in-
creases polynomially (instead of exponentially) with increasing number of voters.
(For an example, see Leech (2002c) who uses this method for evaluating the quali-
fied majority rule for the Council of Ministers in the EU.) Unfortunately, Cantor’s
method provides merely the information of how many winning coalitions with a
certain weight sum exist without specifying the actual members. This prevents any
deduction as to minimal winning coalitions.
(b) Once having identified the MWCs we solve a standard optimization prob-
lem with linear constraints. Consider the example from section 2. The minimum
coalitions are
{A,B}, {A,C,D}, {A,C,E}, {A,C, F},(1)
{B,C,D}, {B,C,E}, (A,D,E}, {B,D,E, F}.
Let wi denote the weight of player i. and let Q denote the absolute quota. Any
new weight vector w = (wA, wB, ..., wF ) has to preserve the winning property of (2),
i.e.
wA + wB ≥ Q,(2)
wA + wC + wD ≥ Q,
wA + wC + wE ≥ Q,
wA + wC + wF ≥ Q,
wB + wC + wD ≥ Q,
wB + wC + wE ≥ Q,
wA + wD + wE ≥ Q,
wB + wD + wE + wF ≥ Q.
In general, with n many players and m MWCs the system of inequaltities can be
summarized as
(3) Aw ≥ ~Q,
where A is a m× n matrix and ~Q = (Q,Q, ..., Q).
Furthermore, we have to ensure that no further MWCs will be generated. This
will be assured by not allowing the weights to rise, i.e. we demand
wA ≤ 6,(4)
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wB ≤ 5,
...
wF ≤ 1.
In short
(5) Iw ≤ ~w0,
where I stands for the n × n identity matrix and ~w0 = (6, 5, ..., 1) for the initial
weight.
Let Aj denote the j’s row of A. Minimizing the range of the weight sum of the
MWCs now boils down to finding a weight vector w which solves the optimization
problem ∑
i,ji<j
(Aiw −Ajw)2 → min!
subject to the side constraints (3) and (5). This is a standard optimization prob-
lem. Since we are interested in a solution that preserves equal weights between
members we put the initial condition accordingly.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma C.1. 20 Take w1, w2 ∈ N. Then all sufficiently large positive integers can
be expressed as non-negative combinations of w1, w2.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that w1 ≥ w2. Assume for the moment
that there are two integers h and h + 1 that can be expressed as a non-negative
combination of w1 an w2. This implies we can also generate the set 2h, 2h+1, 2h+2.
By repeating this argument it follows that we can generate the numbers hw2, hw2+
1, ..., hw2 + w2. Hence we can generate any number n ∈ N since for any n it holds
that n = j mod w2 for any j ∈ {0, 1, ..., w2 − 1}.
It remains to be shown that linear combinations of w1 and w2 generate subsequent
integers eventually. Since gcd(w1, w2) = 1 the smallest positive number n with
n = 0 mod w1 and n = 0 mod w2 is n = w1w2. Consider two numbers k, l ∈
20This result was developed in a discussion with Maurice Koster.
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{0, 1, ..., w1 − 1} with
(6) kw2 = j mod w1, lw2 = j mod w1
for any j ∈ {0, 1, ..., w1 − 1}. Then (k − l)w2 = 0 mod w1 and hence k = l. Thus
any remainder j is generated by exactly one k ∈ {0, 1, ..., w1 − 1}. 
Lemma C.2. Let A1 ⊂ A2 ⊂ ...Ak ⊂ Ak+1 ⊂ ... be an increasing chain of sets of
voters, with each voter i having an integer number wi ≥ 1 of votes (his weight). Let
ak be the total number of votes in set Ak, and for a given real number q, 0 < q < 1,
let hk be the smallest integer ≥ qak. For any coalition B, let w(B) be the total
number of votes in B. Let α be an upper bound on all wi, on all sets Ak. Assume
that there are integers z1, z2, ..., zr such that (a) for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ r, the number of
voters with weight zj in set Ak grows without bound as k →∞, and (b) the greatest
common divisor (g.c.d.) of z1, z2, ..., zr is 1. Then, for sufficiently large k, each
voter i belongs to at least one coalition T ⊂ Ak with w(T ) = hk .
Proof. From Lemma C.1 follows that since the zj have g.c.d. equal to 1, we know
any integer m can be expressed in the form of a linear combination x1z1+ ...+xrzr,
where the xj are integers. More importantly, there exists a number, s, such that any
m ≥ s can be expressed in the form x1z1+ ...+ xrzr, where the xj are non-negative
integers. Clearly, if all are non-negative, then none can be larger thanm itself. From
this it will follow that any integer m, with s ≤ m ≤ s + α, can be written in the
form x1z1+ ...+xrzr, where the xj are non-negative integers, not greater than s+α.
Choose now k large enough so that
(1) Ak contains a subset S with at least s+α voters of each weight zj (1 ≤ j ≤ r).
(2) Ak − S has at least one voter of each type.
(3) w(S) ≤ ak − hk, and
(4) s+ 2α ≤ hk.
From the above discussion, we know that S will have subsets S′ such that w(S′) can
have any integer value between s and s+ α.
From (3) we have that
w(Ak − S) ≥ hk.
From (4) we see that, for any player i,
hk − s− α− wi ≥ 0.
There is no loss of generality, now, in assuming that i ∈ Ak − S. (In fact, by (2),
even if i ∈ S, there will be some other player with the same weight in Ak − S.) Let
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V = Ak − S − i. We see then that w(V ) ≥ hk − wi. Since no voter has more than
α votes, it will follow that, if we remove players, one by one, from the set, the total
votes in the set can never decrease by more than α at each step. Thus we see that,
for every n satisfying 0 ≤ n ≤ hk − wi − α, the set V has a subset T ′ such that
n ≤ w(T ′) ≤ n+ α. In particular, there is some T ′ ⊂ V with
hk − s− wi − α ≤ w(T ′) ≤ hk − s− wi.
This means however that
s ≤ hk − wi − w(T ′) ≤ s+ α.
Thus, S has at least one subset, S′, with w(S′) = hk − wi − w(T ′). Now, let
T = T ′ ∪ S′ ∪ {i}.
Since T ′ and S′ are disjoint, and neither contains i, it follows that
w(T ) = w(T ′) + w(S′) + wi = hk.

Note: the proof of the corollary is similar to this. We omit details.
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